THE NATION

JANUARY 13, 1962 . . 25c



TESTING

A Strategic Appraisal

by

J. David Singer



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LETTERS

Invitation to Women

Dear Sirs: "Women Strike for Peace" [see "Mandate for Kennedy," by Stephanie Gervis, Dec. 30 issue] plans a demonstration at the White House on January 15 at 1 P.M. The purpose is manifold: To protest against further atomic testing, particularly in the atmosphere; to protest the shelter program, that "cruel deception"; and to back efforts—any efforts—at disarmament. But the primary purpose is simply to show that there are human beings, American women of every possible political persuasion, immensely involved in the question of human survival.

"Women Strike for Peace" is not an actual organization. It has no head, no treasurer, no national office, no membership list; nevertheless it's growing at an astounding rate. . . . If any of your readers would like to join us, all they need to do is be at the White House at the proper time. They will be members in good standing.

PENNY BLUM

New York City

Muckraker's Medium

Dear Sirs: Due to moving around, *The Nation* reached me a little late and so I just read Daniel Aaron's review of *The Muckrakers* [Dec. 9, 1961]. He says, quite rightly, the muckrake man is no longer hired by the mass magazines. But hasn't an even greater mass medium taken on some of the old muckraking in a strange way? We have been surprised to see the open critical way such major studio productions as *Executive Suite, Twelve Angry Men, A Man Is Ten Feet Tall, Rebel Without a Cause, Baby Doll* and *The Wild Ones* have dealt with sore spots in American life and been well received and praised. Who can explain this phenomenon—like that of the film *Grapes of Wrath* in an earlier era? Lincoln Steffens would have given much to be able to reach so wide an audience with what he had to say.

ELLA WINTER

Kloster, Switzerland

The Non-Review

Dear Sirs: As an old friend and contributor to *The Nation,* I trust I may be permitted a few words of protest at Geoffrey Barraclough's "review" [Dec. 2 issue] of D. F. Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins*. In his eagerness to set forth his own ideas (a temptation to which all reviewers, myself included, are subject), G. B. forgot to review the book, which is a great pity. His ideas, moreover, are quite whimsical—if I may say so without disrespect. He dismisses the cold war as an "obsession" (which, of course, it is) and blames Fleming for writing about it — as if we could transcend an obsession by ignoring it, even when the obsession, if not transcended, threatens all of us with disaster. He denies that the Russian Revolution was "the great turning point in modern history" and adds that "any competent historian with the slightest inkling of the facts knows that this was not the case." What historian? What competence? What inkling? What facts?

Fleming's book, which G. B. failed to review, is one of the great works of our time, deserving of most thoughtful attention by all readers of *The Nation* and, let us hope, by all literate Americans. . . . All who read it and ponder on its implications may find ways and means of promoting the survival, rather than the suicide, of the human race.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Woodrow Wilson Prof. of Government

Williamstown, Mass.

New Student Voice

Dear Sirs: This is to bring to the attention of *Nation* readers the existence of a lively student quarterly, *The Activist,* published by Oberlin College undergraduates and devoted to a sympathetic analysis of the student movement and its myriad forms and moods.

Our goal is to help enable students to find themselves in the growing movement for social and political justice, to help them take an active part in the democratization of society.

All inquiries and comments are welcome. Subscriptions are $1 per year. Address: 63 East Lorain, Oberlin, Ohio.

JONATHAN EISEN

Editor, *The Activist*

Not All Quacks

Dear Sirs: I was shocked to read the false statements and implications in Vern L. Bullough's review of *The Toadstool Millionaires* and two other books in your Dec. 2 issue. The reviewer implies that all non-orthodox medical treatments are quackery. . . . Dr. Hoxsey's treatments [for cancer] have been very carefully investigated, documented and approved by groups of intelligent, objective and ethical individuals.

Of course, I do not assert that there is no quackery in the field of non-orthodox healing. Orthodox medicine is full of quacks, also. The point I make is that not all liberal healing principles constitute quackery, as the A.M.A., the American Cancer Society and other organizations state or imply.

Washington, D.C. RALPH D. BROWN

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, JANUARY 13, 1962
VOLUME 194, No. 2

THE NATION

EDITORIALS

Spilling the Beans

In a radio-TV address on New Year's Eve, Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes managed to get the new year off to a bad start for his friends in our State Department and our Central Intelligence Agency. North Americans, he said, tend to become "hysterical" when they suffer a setback, as in the Cuban invasion fiasco last April, and this womanish instability is aggravated by our "noisy press and the Gringo pro-Communists." That could be borne; the real embarrassment was in General Ydigoras' contention that he had been promised a "just price" for providing training camps for the anti-Castro freedom fighters and that the United States had welshed on the agreement. The embarrassment was rendered more acute by the Ydigoras allegation that the just price was to take the form of American help in persuading Great Britain, our NATO ally, to turn over British Honduras to good little Guatemala.

All this, of course, rests on the word of President Ydigoras alone, and since he is a confirmed and resourceful liar, it would not appear to rest on much. President Ydigoras had repeatedly denied that Guatemala had furnished facilities to the CIA and its anti-Castro battalions; not until nine months after the invasion did he decide to unburden himself. Lincoln White, the State Department press officer, did indeed deny that the United States had made "any offer of good offices" in the British Honduras issue, and stressed the fact that there was "no written record" of the promise which was so vivid in the recollection of Señor Ydigoras. However, other Washington officials, unnamed but probably members or fellow-travelers of the State Department, suggested that "conceivably" some such promise might have been made "casually" to Señor Ydigoras by officials of the CIA. This version sounds rather probable, and quite consistent with what is known of the monumental bungling and improvisation which marked the events of April. For, as Señor Ydigoras says, it was a "great favor" that Guatemala did for Uncle Sam, and the agents of Uncle who were down there in the thick of the preparations must surely have promised something special in return. If not help in getting Ydigoras additional territory to misgovern, then what?

The question remains what, aside from the Christmas spirit, impelled President Ydigoras to spill the beans at this particular time? A reasonable inference is that these revelations and accusations are connected with the forthcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the Americas to pass judgment on the obstreperous Castro [see page 27]. Apparently Ydigoras, in addition to a slice of British colonial real estate, would like the role of the most fervent anti-Communist of the Americas, a kind of John Bircher south of the border. To this end, he has commended President Kennedy as a "great statesman," far above "the filthy mud spread by his fellow citizens in the press, radio and television," and advised him that he must undertake a "sequel" to the April invasion. If President Kennedy has had any such idea, this advice may well give him second thoughts. The lesson of April, 1961, which is just as valid in January, 1962, is that the less one has to do with the Ydigorases of the hemisphere, the better.

More Blackmail

The humble Ydigoras wants only American aid on a scale befitting his small country, plus British Honduras. From Franco, the dictator of the motherland, much weightier exactions may be expected. Spain occupies a more strategic position in relation to the world-wide task of containing, and if possible rolling back, communism than even the largest Latin American countries. Our investment in Spain is proportionate: we have poured in over $1.2 billion in military and economic aid since 1953. The four American-built bases alone cost $400 million. All this Franco knows full well; he also knows that in 1963 he will have hapless Uncle Sam over a barrel. This is a matter of unfortunate synchronization—unfortunate for Uncle, but fortunate for Franco. In 1951, construction was started on five U.S. air bases in Morocco by agreement with the French, who were masters there at the time. In 1959, the French were no longer masters and President Eisenhower had to yield to a Moroccan demand to evacuate the bases by the end of 1963. But the Spanish-American pact was signed in September, 1953, to run for ten years, so it terminates at practically the same time as the U.S.-Moroccan

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treaty. The Spanish-American treaty may be renewed for two five-year terms, but this requires the consent of both parties. Franco's terms may therefore be expected to stiffen, and in fact he as much as said so in a speech to his officers in October of last year.

Franco's appetite is whetted not only by normal dictatorial greed, but by anxiety. Spain has two enclave cities on Morocco's Mediterranean coast, Melilla and Ceuta, besides Ifni on the Atlantic Coast; all three are coveted by Morocco. In the winter of 1956-57, Moroccans actually attacked Ifni. The lesson of Goa has not been lost on Franco; in behalf of Portugal there was much deploring, but no help. Accordingly, Franco will demand modern arms from the United States for the defense of Spain's colonies and the Franco dictatorship itself. There are indications that he will request not only modern fighter-bombers, but nuclear weapons for his Army and Air Force.

These premonitory trouble signs are apparent to the State Department, and efforts have been made to assuage Franco's appetite by a visit of state and assurances of respect. Like John Foster Dulles in 1958, Dean Rusk hastened from the NATO meeting in Paris last month to fill in Franco on the proceedings. Since Spain is not a member of NATO, this gesture was no doubt gratifying to the dictator and his entourage, but one can scarcely go along with the statement of *The New York Times* correspondent who declared that the Franco regime "is far more responsive to such personal gestures by high United States officials than to the 'nuts and bolts' question of . . . military and economic aid."

If Secretary Rusk read this sweet expression of trust, a deep sigh must have issued from his bosom. Would that it were so! Franco is one of the toughest bargainers of the century. Nuts and bolts, aircraft and rockets, howitzers and mortars, destroyers and submarines, fusion and fission are ever on his mind. Dictators come high these days, and this dictator has our bases as hostages. Historians may look back on our era and conclude that the Russians could scarcely have been more of a bother and menace than the Allies whom we bought and never got through paying.

The Shelter Bible

At last it's out! The title: *Fallout Protection: What To Know and What To Do About Nuclear Attack*. The print order: 25 million for a start, more if needed. The agonies of its preparation rivaled those of the worst movie script ever filmed, with writers hired and fired seriatim and the studio heads finally writing the dialogue themselves. A team from Time, Inc. was among the casualties. And now, in painful suspense, the authors must await the verdict of the critics and that of posterity, if posterity is still around to speak its mind.

If the underlying facts are disregarded, *Fallout Protection* is a good piece of exposition. It admits that there would be frightful losses, it is clearly and simply written, it deals realistically with the effects of a 5-megaton explosion (a modest caliber, indeed, in the light of the recent Soviet test series). The basic fact which it ignores is that to survive a full-scale nuclear war the nation must go completely underground and the war must be conveniently postponed until the transition has been achieved — a matter of a decade or longer at a cost so staggering as to threaten the national economy. Arthur Krock points out these basic and fatal flaws in his *New York Times* column (January 2). "The booklet," Krock concludes, "since its purposes are to concentrate the public mind on chances of survival that cannot stand harsh analysis, and to demonstrate that the Government at last has a viable policy, omits the harsh analysis and gilds the policy."

The January issues of two mass magazines of entirely different types contain the truth about shelters, as nearly as it can be approximated, where the government pamphlet evades it. *Consumer Reports* contains articles by Dexter Masters, who has had long experience with radiological problems and is entirely skeptical of the shelter idea, and Ralph Lapp, who believes that an adequate blast, fire and fallout shelter for a family of four can be built for between $3,000 and $5,000 — survival, in other words, for the well-to-do. In *Redbook*, Walter Goodman writes on "The Truth About Fallout Shelters": the truth is that "no one can assure any family that it would be saved in a nuclear attack, no matter how substantial its shelter."

Concluding his condemnation of the government pamphlet, Arthur Krock falls back on the ancient military formula: "the only adequate . . . shelter from nuclear attack is a military and economic power no enemy will dare to invoke." *Redbook* concludes with a quotation from Howard E. Dentler of the International Convention of Christian Churches: "My family and I will do our utmost to live with our neighbors, community and world so as to reduce the possibility of hatred and war, and if we fail, we will die with our world." By the time the shelter program comes before Congress, millions of Americans will have arrived at Mr. Dentler's conclusion.

The Legacy

Of Rafael L. Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, it may truly be said that nothing became his life like the leaving of it. Nor can anything be more ironical than the legacy he involuntarily left. After his assassination, his heirs decamped with enough swag to start another country, but not all the family assets were movable. The total may have amounted to as much as $1.5 billion and

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what they could not take with them — hotels, ranches, live stock, breweries, slaughterhouses, sugar plantations, factories and mills producing everything from plywood to shoes — now presents an economic and social problem of the first magnitude. This congeries of enterprises is estimated at about $800 million; proportionate to national wealth, it is perhaps the largest government-controlled accumulation of property in the hemisphere. If it is nationalized, Trujillo, one of the loudest anti-Communists of his era, will have set his country on the road to socialism just as radically as Fidel Castro has socialized Cuba. On the other hand, there are probably insuperable difficulties in any attempt to return the properties to private enterprise. Many of them were stolen, but not only by Trujillo; the original owners had stolen them too. If the properties are sold, the buyers will be mainly Americans and the cry of "Yankee imperialism" will ring over the Caribbean. If the collective ownership is retained, American capitalists will groan and toss in their sleep, both because of a second more or less Marxist state on their doorstep and because they will be shut out of a possibly lucrative market. Trujillo liked to refer to himself as "El Benefactor"; it became his official title. In death he may indeed be a benefactor, but not in the way he intended.

Quid Pro Quo

Mortimer M. Caplin, the New Frontier's Commissioner of Internal Revenue, has wisely and shrewdly determined to establish a friendlier, franker relationship between the individual taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service. In the past — let's face it — the relationship has been pretty grim; the cold formality of the IRS has suggested that it was out to gouge the taxpayer who, in fiscal self-defense, has felt justified in fudging a bit in his returns if he could get away with it. This year Form 1040 — the first bad news of any year — contains a friendly foreword by Mr. Caplin in which he quotes Justice Holmes: "Taxes are what we pay for civilized society." Admirable in tone and style, the foreword should help to get taxpayers and tax collectors back on speaking terms. But the effect may well be dissipated by a small news item (December 28) — it was not headlined in any paper we read — in which the President announced that he had given the Senate Judiciary Committee the power to examine individual income-tax returns for the years from 1950 to 1960. The White House said that the President's action had been taken at the request of the Internal Security subcommittee. The same power was given HUAC in an Executive order issued on April 25, 1961.

It is a pity that there is no apposite quote from Justice Holmes on the propriety of these Executive orders. But the good effect of Mr. Caplin's foreword can be saved if the income-tax returns of every member of Congress are made available to the inspection of any taxpayer. After all, if Rep. Francis Walter and Senator James Eastland, and their adorable staff members, are to be permitted to riffle individual returns without let or hindrance, then a civilized society should at least insist that the citizen be given the privilege of examining the returns of the rifflers. The curiosity of the Representatives, in these matters, is no greater nor more pertinent than the curiosity of the citizen. Finally, we could gladly concede to the committees the privilege of examining our returns in exchange for the privilege of examining those of Messrs. Walter and Eastland — and some of their colleagues.

TESTING: A Strategic Appraisal . . *by J. David Singer*

AS EVEN the most casual observer of international politics knows, nations which are locked into any kind of power competition are always under tremendous pressure to emulate one another's behavior. This tendency is particularly pronounced in the sort of power competition known as an arms race — so much so that one might (as did a recent *New York Times* letter-writer) well call it "nuclear ping-pong." All of the powerful domestic forces seem to line up inexorably on the "we must stay ahead" or "we must catch up" side, and the resultant coalition is usually unbeatable. Though the motivation is often greed or stupidity, most of the proponents of party or superiority are well-intentioned and competent men who are caught up in a web of reciprocity from which they seem unable to find a safe exit. The result is an invisible alliance between the sincere patriots on each side, producing a spiraling of armaments and tensions and more armaments until those responsible for their nation's security are easily persuaded that the other is planning to strike first. This process has often led in the past to wars that "no one wanted"—and gives every indication of doing so once more, but this time with consequences far more serious.

The very magnitude of the possible consequences has helped both hasten and hinder the process this time, with Khrushchev and Kennedy alike caught in the historical trap.

J. DAVID SINGER is Associate Research Political Scientist in the Mental Health Research Institute at the University of Michigan and author of the forthcoming Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament *(Ohio State University Press).*

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Each side has made a number of efforts to break out, but the unholy alliances of the "arm-to-parley" advocates both here and in the USSR have effectively paralyzed these attempts. It now looks as if they will once more succeed in driving the world even closer to nuclear cataclysm; Khrushchev has already capitulated to his "catch up" chorus and Kennedy seems perilously close to defeat at the hands of our "stay ahead" soothsayers.

The likelihood of an impending "victory" for our arms-race faction in the atmospheric-testing issue is enhanced by a pair of factors which has seldom before been present with such clarity. One is the tendency of our responsible critics to abdicate their role and defer to the judgment of the President. The other is the tendency of the President to base his decision largely on the technical evaluation of the latest Soviet test series. This unhappy concatenation is manifested in Walter Lippmann's television comment that he was, in effect, giving his proxy to Hans Bethe. The net result of these two factors is to foreclose serious debate on the issue, make it more difficult for the President to resist the "let's test" groups (even supposing he wanted to) and turn the decision over to exactly those people who are institutionally incapable of seeing the larger and longer picture.

LEAVING the larger picture aside for the moment, it might be useful to look more closely at those very technical and strategic considerations which are likely to determine our fateful decision. Firstly, what exactly is it that we hope to discover by evaluating the Soviet's recent atmospheric and underground shots? Briefly, the expectation is that we will, by analyzing the atmospheric debris, the seismic and acoustical signals and other empirical evidence, be able to ascertain whether or not —or to what extent—the Kremlin has overtaken or surpassed us in nuclear-weapons technology.

More particularly, our technicians want to know what advances the potential enemy may have made regarding: (a) the fission-to-fusion ratio and (b) the weight-to-yield ratio. Information regarding the fission-fusion relationship could, in turn, tell us something regarding the number and cost, as well as the "cleanliness," of their future stockpile, while weight-yield information might shed light on the size and compactness of the warheads (and missiles) that could be produced. Though the kinds of inferences we can make from the limited evidence are both numerous and imprecise, it is the sort of process which, when combined with other intelligence techniques, provides the only basis upon which any such estimates can be made. Let us look, therefore, at the conclusions which seem to emerge from the analyses so far, and try to appraise their strategic implications. I will first examine their impact on Soviet capabilities and upon the stability of the military environment.

One finding that allegedly emerges is that the Soviets have been able to reduce the fission requirements for the triggering mechanism in their warheads. If this assertion is correct, it means that their warheads could become both cheaper and more plentiful, since it is the enriched uranium or plutonium used for the fission trigger which is so costly and time-consuming to produce. What would be the impact on their capabilities?

Certainly a larger inventory would improve their ability to launch a saturation-type attack and destroy a greater portion of our retaliatory weapons. But it would also permit them to *absorb* an opening attack and still retaliate effectively, all other things being equal. Thus a crude increase in the number of Soviet warheads and bombs could have both a *destabilizing* and a *stabilizing* effect on the environment. By increasing the probability of success in (and hence the incentive for) a surprise attack on us, it would be destabilizing, but by increasing the probability of their *surviving* an attack by us and still being able to retaliate effectively, it would diminish their need (or incentive) for getting in the opening blow.

Another possible result of a Soviet advance in reducing the fission requirements would be the ability to produce a "cleaner" weapon. By reducing the fissionable materials used in either trigger or casing, the fission-fusion-fission warhead would produce less radioactive debris in a ground or air burst of equal blast and heat effects. Some of the estimates now being made are that as little as 4 or 5 per cent of the total yield in some of their recent detonations came from enriched uranium or plutonium, with the balance coming from the relatively clean fusion reaction of the hydrogen component. Here, too, there are some difficult interpretations. On the one hand, the less radioactivity generated by these weapons, the less non-military damage they will do if they are used. Thus, civilian populations some distance from strategic targets would be more likely to survive an attack in which cleaner warheads and bombs were employed. However, the very radioactivity generated by the fission-fusion-fission weapon tends to inhibit its use. Free from the fear of serious radioactive "backlash" upon its own territory and upon civilian or neutral spots, a would-be aggressor might well feel freer, with a "cleaner" bomb, to commit the offensive act. Here is a case in which any Soviet advance is a mixed blessing: the cleaner weapons are certainly destabilizing in that they reduce inhibitions against their use; but *if* ever used, fewer lives would be lost.

These, then, are some of the implications of any improvement in the fission-to-fusion ratio. Let us turn now to the implications of the other advance which the Soviet's moratorium-breaking series apparently produced: reduction of the weight-to-yield ratio.

IF SUCH improvement has, in fact, been made, the result would be a lighter, smaller warhead for any given yield in blast, heat and radiation. With the small warhead, one can get by with smaller and less powerful rockets, and these in turn become considerably easier to move around or conceal. And these virtues, in turn, make the nuclear-missile combination more difficult to locate and destroy, hence diminishing its vulnerability.

Here again, one may see this Soviet advance in two different lights. The naive response is that it will

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strengthen the adversary and hence embolden him in his aggressiveness. But this overlooks a central question: is invulnerability of strategic forces of much use to the side that intends to shoot first? Obviously not; if they are to be used in the opening assault, they need no protection at all. But if their intended use is for a *retaliatory* blow, invulnerability is highly desirable. Moreover, the side whose strategic forces are well protected via concealment, mobility, hardening, dispersal and quantity, enjoys some confidence that he can ride out a surprise attack and still respond adequately.

Two very important consequences flow from such an acknowledged state of affairs. Firstly, the USSR knows, given the near-certainty of massive reprisal, that the adversary is less likely to strike first. Secondly, he himself has little incentive to strike first, knowing that it is less necessary to do so in order to preserve his own retaliatory forces. In a nutshell, the less vulnerable the Soviet's retaliatory weapons are, the better for *both* sides. Mutual invulnerability can make an important contribution to the stability of a stand-off which already has an overabundance of *de*stabilizing characteristics.

Another possibility of a Soviet improvement in the weight-per-kiloton yield is that the Russians might decide to use the space and weight thus saved for the installation of more elaborate, and hence more accurate, guidance devices in their missiles. Such a move would be—if ever confirmed—a particularly alarming and destabilizing one. It would make it easier for them to destroy our own missile sites and airfields by increasing the probability of direct hits. Moreover—and this is the alarming element—it could well signify their interest in *trying* to do so. That is, one needs little accuracy in order to hit and destroy cities and industrial centers, which are (or should be) the objectives of a retaliatory blow. High accuracy is desirable only for the side which has some interest in destroying the *other's* retaliatory forces—and there is little point in making such an effort unless one intends to strike first.

An additional implication of Soviet improvement in yield-weight ratios is the degree to which it advances their development of the anti-missile missile. One of the retarding factors in this field has been the need for fairly large rockets to carry the large anti-missile warhead; compactness would, in turn, probably ease the central problem, which is that of guidance. So if these advances do ease the Soviet's anti-missile problem — and in his address to the recent party Congress, General Malinovsky implied that other progress had also been made — there is some chance that we may fall behind in this very crucial aspect of the arms race. What might be the strategic implications of such an event?

A ONE-SIDED breakthrough on the anti-missile front would undoubtedly be one of the more destabilizing events of this technological generation. Not only would the availability of such a weapon in quantity make its owner somewhat more secure against a surprise attack (assuming that detection and early-warning techniques continue to improve), but it would have an even greater utility in fending off the retaliatory blow of a nation whose missiles and bombers had been badly crippled and depleted by a first strike. This is our benchmark of stability: is a weapon more advantageous to the side which strikes first or to the one which must retaliate? And since the victim of a surprise attack would have to defend against a fully-organized massive salvo with very little warning, he would find the anti-missile far less useful than the attacker-turned-defender, who would have a thoroughly alerted interceptor force ready to meet the remnants of a badly crippled retaliatory one.

On the other hand, there has been a strong tendency to exaggerate the significance of this projected weapon. We overlook the simple fact that no such weapon would ever approach 100 per cent in its interception reliability, and that even a weakened retaliatory salvo would penetrate to its targets with a dispersal and intensity sufficient to obliterate many of the attacker's cities, factories and transport facilities. With a retaliatory force large and invulnerable enough, one can always count on getting in a punishing (and hopefully, unacceptable) counter-blow. Moreover, we are still a long way from a reliable anti-missile, even with the smaller warhead; as others have repeatedly suggested, the guidance problem might be characterized as trying to hit one needle with another when thrown from opposite sides of a dark corridor.

THESE, then, are the strategic implications if all of the gains ascribed to the USSR during its recent nuclear-test series have been made. Some of the implications suggest possible improvements in Soviet capacity to inflict a devastating first strike upon us, or to blunt a retaliatory strike; these are the *destabilizing* potentialities. Others suggest the augmentation of their capacity to fend off and survive a surprise attack; these are the more *stabilizing* potentialities. But, having said this, we must not only bear in mind that the information gathered is relatively imprecise, but that much which flows from it is surmise. More important, it does not at all follow that, because



San Francisco Chronicle

"Any Suggestions?"

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Toronto Star

"Oh well, at least they're engaged."

the Soviet Union may have acquired the capacity to produce (a) more warheads more cheaply, (b) cleaner ones, and (c) more compact ones, they will necessarily do so. If there is one lesson we should have learned from the "missile-gap-that-wasn't" fiasco, it is that we cannot afford to infer intentions and actions from capabilities. But just as SAC and its allies (especially among certain Democratic Senators) insisted on interpreting intelligence estimates of Soviet rocket capabilities as indicative of a massive production plan, so will they now insist on a similar evaluation of the recent tests.

To make such easy inferences, one must assume that the adversary is either unaware of the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of technological innovation, or that he is unconcerned with them. Though the Kremlin has evinced far less interest than we in these considerations so far (their conduct in the "surprise attack" conference of 1958, and their reluctance to exchange "fail-safe" procedure information being two manifestations), there is no reason to assume that they are and always will be indifferent to the stability problem.

Moreover, there is little value in castigating the Soviet Union for acts of irresponsibility which are already "water over the dam." Our problem is twofold: (a) to find a way to persuade them not to repeat their irresponsible action, and (b) to make sure that we ourselves behave responsibly in regard to the delicate balance of terror. The relationship between these two problems is of obvious intimacy, and while conventional wisdom might lead us to resume atmospheric tests in order to offset the Kremlin's gains, such a response would be likely to produce inimical results on both counts.

Assuming for the moment that all of the Soviets' alleged gains have been made and that they will attempt to incorporate them into the next generation of warheads, what would be the implications of our following suit? The first question concerns the fission-to-fusion ratios. If we were able to produce cheaper, cleaner and more numerous weapons, would it enhance our security? As I suggested in appraising the adversary's potentialities, an increase in the *size* of our inventory would improve both our strike-first and strike-back capabilities. But if ours is clearly and unambiguously a strike-back strategy only, there should be no incentive to improve our strike-first capacity; to do so would help convey aggressive intentions to the adversary and strengthen particularly the "no peace" faction in the USSR.

AS TO our strike-back inventory, does that *need* to be augmented? The answer would seem to be a fairly clear negative. Not only is our stockpile already larger than the Soviets' by a perceptible margin (we have almost 40,000 bombs and warheads totaling about 35,000 megatons), it is already larger than need be for retaliatory purposes. Even if the Russians could destroy three-quarters of our manned bombers and land-based missiles, the remaining quarter, combined with the nearly a hundred (six submarines with sixteen missiles each) Polaris weapons could certainly rain a highly destructive blow on their cities and factories. One of the few assets of contemporary weapons technology is that it permits the non-aggressive side to lag well behind in sheer destructive capability. This virtue must be exploited for far-sighted purposes, not ignored to satisfy the jingoists and those who would degrade our deterrent by making it more provocative.

As to the pursuit of "cleaner" warheads, the issue has two components: the tactical and the strategic. If we were to make real progress in *strategic* warheads of markedly reduced fallout, it would certainly add something to the credibility of our threat to retaliate. But it would also increase our temptation to use—or threaten to use—them in future political crises, thus strengthening the hand of the "credible first strike" faction here as well as in the USSR. Regarding cleaner *tactical* weapons, our capacity and willingness to fight a limited nuclear war would be enhanced, but the liabilities of this form of battlefield combat are so widely accepted today that it appears to be playing a diminishing role in NATO planning.

While discussing the cleaner weapons' assets and liabilities, we might pause briefly to consider another argument often made in favor of continued testing: the need to pursue the "neutron bomb." Paradoxical as it may seem, the same people who want to develop cleaner weapons also advocate development of this ultra-dirty weapon, usually on the grounds that it could be a decisive battlefield weapon. Detonated in the air, with only limited heat and blast effects, it would allegedly kill all living matter in its destructive radius, but leave weapons and buildings intact and little residual radioactivity. The same disadvantages apply to this as to the cleaner tactical weapons: when both sides have them, they tend to cancel each other out. This is much less true of strategic weapons whose purpose is not to defend or gain territory, but to obliterate it.

TURNING to the *beneficial* effects that might stem from an American advance in weight-to-yield ratio, the case is much less clear-cut. Just as the more compact and mobile warhead would make the Soviet strike-back weapons less vulnerable, so would they enhance our own, to the advantage of both sides. On the other hand, unless the adversary were to increase markedly the megatonnage of his striking forces, enabling him to hit us with a saturation attack, enough of our retaliatory force already has adequate durability. This is especially true in view of the Polaris system, whose vulnerability will remain extremely low until there is a major breakthrough in underwater detection. As to the application of more compact weapons to tactical needs, it is hard to take this argument seriously; unless radical changes occur in Soviet tactics and

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capabilities, our present tactical nuclears are more than adequate.

Finally, there is the anti-missile problem, and as suggested earlier, this is the most persuasive argument for renewed atmospheric tests. If the potential enemy gets it first, it markedly strengthens his capacity to fend off a retaliatory attack, and hence offers an increased temptation to strike first. Against a surprise attack, however, it would not be nearly as useful. Thus, its usefulness to the nation whose strategy precludes the preventive or pre-emptive attack is clearly limited; basically the anti-missile is a destabilizing weapon. And like the cleaner, smaller or more accurate strategic or tactical weapon, our deterrent is as effective without it as with it.

The thesis of this article then, is that we are well on the way to having as effective a deterrent as military capability is ever likely to offer. Our weakness is in the manpower and conventional-weapons field, and this can be repaired by jettisoning the "more bang for a buck" doctrine, not by "improving" our nuclear arsenal.

While it is certainly true that every weapons system has some marked first-strike characteristics, each also is basically better for one role or the other. The more we pursue weapons of first-strike characteristics, the more likely we are to provoke the adversary to pre-empt—and vice versa. Moreover, whenever either side moves toward an improvement in its own first-strike capabilities, the other is under intense pressure to follow suit.

This is our situation today, and President Kennedy will require considerable courage to stand firm against the naive, the ignorant and the shortsighted. But he will need more than courage; he will need powerful support from the more sophisticated and farsighted among us. The pro-testers' bandwagon is rolling and it will not be stopped by apathy. If we resume atmospheric testing, we will be demonstrating once more that on the level of morality, we are no better than the Soviet Union, and on the level of intelligence, no better than all the other great powers that stumbled into decadence and defeat along the path of conventional wisdom.

CASTRO and the OAS . . . *by Carleton Beals*

THE CURRENT popular song in Cuba, by composer Carlos Puebla, goes something like this:

> The sardine is alert
> Lest the shark attack;
> Nineteen will be devoured
> but the twentieth will live—
> With OAS or without OAS
> We will win the battle.

It is a lugubrious, if not unhopeful, preview of what Cuba suspects will be the outcome of the January 22 Conference of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in Uruguay, called specifically to consider the problem of the Castro regime.

The Cubans believe they have already won much. The failure of the April invasion, they allege, revealed the bankruptcy of a policy of brute force and has shaken confidence that gold can rule all. This, they say, has forced Kennedy to seek a "pseudo-collective" aggression against the island by attempting to convert the Organization of American States (OAS) into a dutiful instrument of U.S. policy. The effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, Cubans believe, represented an attempt by the United States to maintain its military, political and financial hegemony over the entire New World. The real aim, they insist, of our recent moves and countermoves in the Dominican Republic has been to create a puppet regime and thereby win acquiescence in future similar aggressive moves against Cuba. Finally, the Cubans argue, if the United States were really interested in "democracy," it would cease giving massive military and financial aid to Duvalier in Haiti, Somosa in Nicaragua and Stroessner in Paraguay—the most overt dictators remaining in the hemisphere.

So much for the Cuban view, which ignores or minimizes a number of factors, such as the extent to which domestic political pressures shape or restrict American policy and the unenviable choices with which past mistakes, committed over a long period of time, necessarily confront the Kennedy Administration (see, for example, Rayford W. Logan's article on the Dominican Republic, issue of December 16). Nevertheless, the fact is that in its campaign to win over the governments, if not the people, of Latin America, the present Administration has spent large sums on propaganda, has continued to subsidize reactionary elements and has utilized the entrenched position of its military missions and FBI agents who work with nearly every police force on the continent. A recent item in a column by C. L. Sulzberger (*The New York Times*, December 25), is eloquent in its understatements:

> The CIA threw support to Presidential nominees in more than one country and not all its choices were successful. In a land I shall call "Banania," a relatively recent election ended with defeat for the CIA candidate. However, he contested the result. Consequently, a U.S. military aircraft arrived containing a gray-haired gentleman who preferred to be identified only as "Joe." "Joe" instructed his principal contact in "Banania" to arrange that the defeated nominee be given a choice post and $200,000 in exchange for withdrawing his opposition. This was done. "Joe" departed.

There have been too many Joes and they have been active in too many countries. But, in fairness, it

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should be noted that the Administration has attempted to attract liberal elements by its Alliance for Progress program, Food for Peace, the Peace Corps and a variety of other measures. Rightly or wrongly, many Latin Americans feel that these measures, far from being a bona fide effort on behalf of our neighbors, are tainted with cold-war motivations.

The effect has been to create a sort of schizophrenia in the minds of Latin American politicians. On the one hand, they do not want to become involved in cold-war conflicts (not to mention their ageless fear of Yankee dominance); on the other hand, they fear the revolutionary trend represented by Cuba and want as much American aid as possible. To set the stage for the application of the "Dominican Republic formula" to Cuba, as distinguished from the "Guatemala formula" which was used last spring, the United States must have the support of at least thirteen of the nineteen so-called republics. To win the five Central American nations by pressure and promised aid has proved relatively easy. Haiti presented no problem. Peru, socially the most backward of the South American countries, its government threatened by discontent, was not difficult, particularly with the support of the corrupt leadership of the popular APRA party. This is not the place to analyze the intricate maneuvers in Panama, Columbia and Venezuela, countries that have already broken with Cuba. Paraguay, of course, is honeycombed with American aid missions and has always been "in the bag."

MEXICO and other countries of South America have resisted intervention in Cuba of any kind, even economic. The hard core of the opposition has consisted of Mexico and, in South America, of Ecuador and Brazil, where recent attempted reactionary coups—which leftists say were aided by our military missions and CIA agents—failed. In both countries, liberal regimes adhere firmly to the nonintervention line. Bolivia, which has had its own agrarian revolution of sorts, remains strongly anti-interventionist despite virtual economic control of the country by U.S. aid missions. Neither Chile nor Uruguay, where pro-Cuban sentiment is stronger than anywhere on the continent except in Brazil and Ecuador, has been willing to risk following the U.S. policy. It did seem that, in the recent OAS vote convening the new Punta del Este Conference, Uruguay had been won over by Washington, but the Uruguayan government was obliged to repudiate its representative, who resigned. Thus the United States is still minus at least one vote for the two-thirds it needs to carry the OAS.

This vote can be obtained in one of two ways. The first is to get sanctions removed from the Dominican Republic [OAS voted this step last week—Ed.]; the second, to win over Argentina. Frondizi, who is a virtual prisoner of the Army, but also a military manipulator who is now ruling by oppressive military law, has no love for Castro or the Cuban revolution and has shown this in his actions. Still, Argentine sentiment for neutrality and nonintervention is strong. Furthermore, the recent discovery that certain documents allegedly proving Cuban meddling in Argentina's internal affairs were false aroused a good deal of popular indignation. But present indications are that Frondizi's meeting with Stevenson in Trinidad, and his consultation with Kennedy at Palm Beach, may be the prelude to a dramatic switch in the Argentine position. Such a switch, of course, would be followed by massive loans to Argentina—and the Cubans may discover that gold still has its manifold uses.

A French View of U.S.-Latin American Relations



Le Nouveau Journal

"Saludos Amigos!"

OF ALL the Latin countries, Mexico has been the most consistent in opposing either intervention in Cuba or unilateral or collective sanctions against her, and has set forth her reasons, both moral and juridical, in more detail than any other. Mexico's opinion commands much respect—the more so because of the diplomatic, propagandistic and economic pressures that have been exerted upon her to change it. Also, Mexico has done more, in many respects, than any other Latin American country to build a bona fide inter-American system, to establish and preserve the proper international safeguards for national independence, self-determination and economic freedom.

Mexico now sees these threatened by a campaign of "anti-communism" and by Kennedy's great "adventure" (the President's own designation). So far the United States has been succeeding in its drive against Cuba, but Mexico sees the road we are following as leading toward disaster and, very likely, the wrecking of the inter-American system. She bases her position on the charters of the United Nations and the OAS, and

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on the various treaties and conventions clustered about them.

Undoubtedly Mexico's attitude owes its origin in part to her own bitter experiences, during the Mexican Revolution, vis-à-vis the United States. Mexico has persevered in her efforts to outlaw aggression against any state regardless of the character of its government. No controversy, the Mexican Foreign Minister said repeatedly during the Cuban crisis, is too serious to be resolved by proper negotiations.

HERE a little background is helpful. The Pan American Union was started in 1889 by James G. Blaine, a man of tarnished reputation, chiefly for the purpose of expanding U.S. commerce. For fifty years it was headed by the Secretary of State and its personnel was almost 100 per cent from this country. Latin Americans soon came to call the organization the "U.S. Ministry of Colonies." That it survived through thirty years of our armed interventions in the Caribbean was due not to the genius of American statesmanship, but to our growing capitalist wealth and power. Moreover, there were many minor matters that could be settled by such contacts as the Pan American Union provided. But the Union was well on the way to collapse until the Good Neighbor policy (an outgrowth of our own depression) brought about, by 1934, the withdrawal of the last Marine contingent from Latin American territory.

At the Pan-American Conference in Montevideo in 1933, nonintervention was established as hemispheric policy — largely on the initiative of the Mexican and the Cuban delegates.

The United States had to make further concessions to its southern neighbors once the U.N. was established, for Washington needed their votes in the world body. Then, at the ill-starred Bogotá conference of 1948, where the United States promised $500 million (not granted until thirteen years later, after the Cuban revolution), the Pan American Union was scrapped and the OAS was set up, giving the Latin American countries for the first time a bona fide voice in a hemispheric grouping. However, an effort to establish headquarters for the new body outside Washington, or at least to give it a rotating headquarters, failed.

THE OAS Charter went far beyond mere organizational procedure to lay down the basis for a just international system. Nonintervention—a "holy phrase" — was written into the Charter in no uncertain language. And no longer could nonrecognition be used by the United States as a coercive measure; any new *de facto* regime, whatever its origin, had to be recognized in a matter of days.

Economic as well as military nonintervention was spelled out in the new Charter. The January, 1942, agreement in Rio de Janeiro had provided that "an act of aggression on the part of a non-American state against any [in the Western Hemisphere] is an act of aggression against all of them." By September, 1947, due to our fear of possible aggression by Perón in Argentina, the wording was altered to read "aggression by an American or non-American state is to be considered an aggression against all the states." This is the wording that now haunts us.

Article 15 of the 1948 Charter, still in effect, states that "No state or *group of states* has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, whatever the motive, in the internal or external affairs of another." The article excluded not merely armed force, "but any other form of coercion or aggressive tendency against the personality of the state, or the political, economic and cultural elements which constitute it." Article 17 declares explicitly that "The territory of a state is inviolable and cannot be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force taken by a state, direct or indirect, whatever the motive."

Obviously these provisos were violated by the sugar and oil embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, as well as by the various trade and travel restrictions we have laid down. They were violated even more openly by the United States, Guatemala and Nicaragua (and possibly also Panama) in connection with the invasion of Cuba, and, prior to that, by the training — in violation of our own neutrality laws — of Cuban "mercenaries" on U.S. soil. The bombing, strafing and leaflet-throwing by planes over Cuba from American fields, an almost nightly process for months, were also violations.

John Foster Dulles endeavored to broaden the meaning of aggression to cover the implantation of alien doctrines from outside the hemisphere, and secured such a declaration in Caracas in 1952. The move was supported by all countries except Guatemala, Mexico and Argentina. But nothing in this situation justified the *putsch* in Guatemala, now known to have been promoted by the CIA with the connivance of Nicaragua and Honduras.

Christian Herter sought to apply this Dulles doctrine at the OAS conference in San José, Costa Rica, in August, 1960. Fidel Castro declared in a speech a few days later:

> The Hemispheric System, about which the United States has talked so much . . . had approved a clause outlawing economic aggression. This clause provided that no country could resort to economic pressures or economic aggression in order to reach any objective or to accomplish any purpose involving the internal policies of another country, or to influence in any way, or change or interfere with the internal affairs of another country. Economic aggression was expressly prohibited by all the countries of this hemisphere. Nevertheless, our country was brutally attacked in its economy, and . . . what happened?
>
> The representatives of the Latin American countries held a meeting in Costa Rica, not to recriminate or condemn the United States, not to try the aggressor, not to punish the attacker, but to issue a declaration against the attacked, to take action against the victim. . . . When the time arrived to condemn the shark, the sardines got together and did not condemn the shark but another sardine. But it so happened that this other sardine was no longer a sardine. . . .

Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello was not happy, at San José, about sanctions against either Trujillo or Castro; he stood on the principle of nonintervention as laid down in the OAS Charter. At the time of the military invasion of Cuba, the Mexican position became even

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stronger. On April 18, Tello had declared pointedly:

> In exercising the right of self-determination of the peoples, without which sovereignty and independence lack all content, it behooves the Cuban people, without outside interference, to translate into concrete realities their aspirations for economic and social improvement. . . .
>
> The Mexican government reiterates its support of the principle of nonintervention, according to which no state or group of states can intervene directly or indirectly, no matter what the motive, in the internal affairs of other states. . . .

That same day, Mexico's U.N. representative, Luis Padilla Nervo, calling attention to the charters of both the U.N. and the OAS, and to other agreements and obligations of the American states, asked for enforcement of the principles of nonintervention, equal rights among nations and self-determination. He pointed out that Article 33 of the U.N. Charter made it the duty of all states to seek a peaceful solution of any controversy. However, he abandoned Mexico's earlier position that New World disputes should be referred to the OAS, giving as his reason the "lamentable" results of this course with respect to the aggression on Cuba launched from Guatemala. His resolution called for (1) an *immediate* demand on all states to stop using their territories and resources to foment civil war in Cuba; (2) the *immediate* cessation of bloodshed in Cuba; (3) and the cooperation of states in seeking a peaceful solution.

IT will likely be Mexico's view, then, that any attempt by the United States at the forthcoming Punta del Este meeting to levy sanctions against Cuba would be a direct violation of the OAS Charter. But even aside from charters and treaty obligations, there is the danger that Washington may, in an election year, permit its obsession with Castro to wreck — even before it has been tested — the kind of program foreshadowed in the Alliance for Progress. In commenting last summer on the first Punta del Este Conference, *The Nation* raised a question the pertinence of which has been demonstrated by recent developments. "What will happen," *The Nation* asked in its issue of Aug. 26, 1961, "the next time a Latin government pleads that it must have a quick $100 million or the Communists will take over next week? Will the President be able to resist this blackmail long enough to question what has happened to the land and tax reforms that were promised — and promptly forgotten?" Senator Margaret Chase Smith, just back from a tour of seven Latin American countries, reports that as far as she could see "Nothing has been done yet in these countries in the way of tax reforms or planning for the specific development projects necessary to qualify for American aid." While from Mexico City, Gerry Robischaud of the Chicago *Daily News* reports that Latin American politicians find the present a "most inopportune" time to launch tax or land reforms. Some politicians, no doubt, fear the reforms will menace their power; others object to them as merely attempts to meddle for the benefit of American interests.

Perhaps these politicians hope to get Alliance for Progress funds, without the reforms, by lining up with us at Punta del Este.

TORTURE (cont.) . . by *Alexander Werth*

Paris

EVERYBODY knows that torture has been for years a recognized form of "warfare" in Algeria. Atrocities have been committed on both sides. But what has shocked liberal opinion in France is that a large part of the French Army now considers the torture of prisoners as perfectly normal. In protest against this, a few high-ranking officers, such as General Paris de Bollardière, have actually resigned from the Army, but to no avail. During a visit to Algeria last year, I had a long conversation with an angelic-looking young German from the Foreign Legion, a worthy heir of the S.S., who talked in the most casual and matter-of-fact way about the manner (or rather, manners — for there were several) in which his unit tortured and then killed captured Algerian soldiers ["A German in Algiers," by Alexander Werth, *The Nation*, March 25, 1961].

The Foreign Legion and various paratroop units have distinguished themselves particularly in this kind of warfare, as we know from Henri Alleg's *La Question*, the enormous dossier collected by the "Audin Committee" (Maurice Audin was a lecturer at Algiers University who was tortured to death by General Massu's paratroopers in 1957), and a variety of other facts. Nevertheless, the de Gaulle Government has opposed the publicizing of anything that tends to discredit his Army.

Therefore, French publishers and editors, for several years now, have been systematically discouraged (to put it mildly) from publishing anything about torture in Algeria; papers, magazines and books guilty of this "offense" have been frequently seized, but—curiously enough—the legal action taken against the offending editors has never yet been allowed to reach the trial stage—presumably for fear of too many beans being spilt.

But in the recent case of M. Lindon, head of that courageous publishing firm, *Editions de Minuit* (established clandestinely during the Occupation), the prosecution committed a major mistake. The charge against M. Lindon was that, by publishing a novel called *Le Déserteur*, he had encouraged desertion and disobedience; but in the indictment, the prosecution quoted not only passages from the book which might be interpreted as "desertion propaganda," but also comments on torture made by various characters in the novel. The references to torture in the indictment enabled M. Lindon's lawyers to produce a number of witnesses claiming to have been either tortured themselves, or to have seen (or heard) others tortured. Since it is not illegal to quote evidence given at an open trial, much of this har-

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rowing stuff has got into the papers. Here are a few samples.

Nelly Forget, a social worker (arrested by paratroopers in 1957):

> The night I was arrested I was taken to the Villa Susini, which has, since then, become notorious. Before undergoing any regular examination, I was taken straight to the torture chamber, where I was subjected to water and electric "treatment." I stayed at the Villa Susini for forty days, and saw and heard a great many things during that time. The nights were filled with the screaming of people who were being tortured. In the cell next to mine there was a young man who went insane. . . . During the forty days I was there, two young men died under torture. There were also ten women there who were tortured the same way as myself. . . . Even before my acquittal, I lodged a complaint against Captain Faulques, Lieutenant Bonnel, a German called Feldmeyer, and three policemen whose names I don't know.

Pierre Boudot, a sergeant-major, reported the confession made to him by a number of French sappers who had been ordered to bury alive four *fellahin*, including an old man of seventy-five. "I believe that what they said was true, because at night they had nightmares and screamed."

Another witness was Benoist Rey, an advertising agent and former member of a commando unit:

> *M. Rosenfeld (Counsel for Lindon):* I should like to know whether . . . M. Rey frequently attended any torture sessions, or whether these were only exceptional in his unit.
>
> *M. Rey:* After two months in this commando, I was appointed infirmary assistant, and had to attend to an enormous number of people, both civilians and FLN soldiers, many of whom had clearly been tortured.
>
> *The Presiding Judge:* Were you actually present at any torture scenes?
>
> *M. Rey:* Yes, I personally attended such scenes. During one year in the commando, I saw about a hundred people having their throats cut. Saw it with my own eyes. I also had to look after people who had been tortured. The officer would tell me to "pep them up" with camphor injections. We refused to do this.
>
> *The Presiding Judge:* Why did you refuse?
>
> *M. Rey:* Because, having been "pepped up," they would have been tortured again, and we didn't want this to happen.

M. Claude Bourdet, editor of *France-Observateur*—a paper which has been seized by the police probably more frequently than any other, and which now quotes pages and pages of the direct evidence produced at the Lindon trial—remarks that after the "blunder" made by the authorities in raising the question of torture in the indictment against M. Lindon, the government will be extremely careful in future to see to it that this does not happen again.

But the fact remains that torture in Algeria is continuing as before. Also, there are close to 2 million men, women and children in "regroupment" camps—in many of which the death rate, especially among the children, is still appalling. Race riots, complete with lynchings, have now become frequent phenomena. With the bulk of the European community—and part of the Army—more or less openly supporting the OAS, de Gaulle's chances of reaching (and especially enforcing) a peace settlement in Algeria now seem as remote as ever.

PITFALLS of PROGRESS . . *by Robert C. Cook*

CAN MAN live in space? One answer is simple: man does. How long can he survive in space? The obvious answer is: only as long as his consumption matches the supplies in his environment.

When the Russians sent Gagarin and Titov orbiting around the earth, and when we fired our astronauts one hundred miles beyond the earth's surface, a temporary but complete ecology was provided for each man. Scientists had, in fact, designed genuine worlds, tiny but complete. Technology had produced environments, adequate to meet the demands of consumption, in which man felt no great discomfort.

When we think of space, we ordinarily think of astronauts, but the fact is that all of us are surviving in space. We live upon a relatively small space-capsule, orbiting around the sun. Aboard this space-craft, we have essentially all the resources we will ever have.

How long can we live without discomfort? The answer: most of the human race has never lived without it. Only in our time has it even appeared *possible* that all of the human race could ever have enough food and shelter to be comfortable.

How long can man survive in this orbit at this speed of consumption? This is the real question. All, or a large part, of the human race could die from a shortage of survival necessities. We are already suffering from major miscalculations of the vital elements of human ecology.

Mankind has a history of waste more costly than its history of hostility. It is long past time that we understand the ecology of man — to grasp the true measure of our resources — and of ourselves. The study of ecology, or what is called "the balance of nature," yields flashing signals—like those which warn the astronaut in flight — that we ignore at our peril.

THE STUDY of the interrelationships of living things with one another and with the basic natural resources of earth, air, water and food, is called ecology, after the Greek *oikos* for house. Surely it is apparent that we face critical survival problems in the House of Man. What may not be so apparent is that we live in a closed environment, with a finite amount of resources. Today we have dangerously upset — even

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without fallout—the balances which have been built up through ages of growth. There are even some nature lovers who say that *man is the greatest contaminant* — and they have an impressive array of evidence for their version of "only man is vile."

Men can readily see the peril of unbalancing the resources of a ship going to the moon. Why is it so difficult for a man to see that his life depends upon the ability of plants to "fix" solar energy? Or that the air he breathes nourishes his life only because it has the right proportion of oxygen — which is again dependent upon plants and the photosynthetic cycle? In our rivers the germs are invisible, but the dirt is not. Any citizen — or Senator — can see what man has done to the Potomac. Each year a thousand American cities and towns have water shortages. They are not secret. You do not need a Geiger counter to see that our resources have not matched our technology on even a short-term, sustained-yield basis. One can only suppose that it does require imagination to see how truly ominous it is when one turns a faucet, and for reasons of human waste, no water comes out.

MAN'S ability to destroy, coupled with his inability to understand his relation with his environment, has created waterless deserts in China and the Near East. These deserts are as man-made as the Appian Way or the aqueducts of Los Angeles.

Where are the grassy valleys of the Southwest which Coronado noted in the fifteenth century? Is there any hope for man to learn from the Carolina hills — so foolishly allowed to erode, and which have had their plant cover built back only since the soil-conservation movement began thirty years ago? Who remembers the Kansas dust storms of the thirties? Or the water problem in Los Angeles last summer?

Time is running out. Man's technology and his population are both exploding. Ever since man first chipped a flint in a cave, he has been introducing new means of attempting to control his environment. Looking back, it is surprising how much one hand-tool — like the axe — can



Population Bulletin

Growth of World Population

do to upset the balance of nature. Probably one has to forgive the ignorant pioneers who swung their axes — one at a time — and changed the conservation pattern of a continent. But their heroic story also includes heroic waste on a heroic scale. The waste of topsoil in the Mississippi Valley probably still remains the largest single effect man has made on earth. Fallout has affected the air of at least an entire hemisphere, but not yet has it had such effects upon man's resources as the axe that leveled forests and the plough that broke the plains. No doubt, in time, it will.

It matters not to the ultimate balance sheet whether the earth's vital materials are depleted by swords or by ploughshares. The point of this essay is that technology is advancing at such an accelerating rate that crises which experts had predicted for two centuries from now will soon be breathing down our necks. The manner in which we are wasting resources, increasing our population and bringing in technological changes without any forethought as to the biological or social ecology of invention and change, is creating one small crisis after another — usually to the aggravation of the other crises of our time.

There is abundant evidence that the great upsurge of nationalism and the haste for technological advance which are now so apparent — and so understandable — in the developing countries, will further accentuate our basic ecological problems. Social movement increases social dislocation. Industrial development inevitably means more air and water pollution and more wasteful use of water and other vital elements. "Vital" here means essential to the maintenance of life.

But because progress is our most important unofficial religion, we devoutly believe "science will come up with something." Our grandfathers mumbled, "Necessity is the mother of invention." If we continue to waste as much as our grandfathers and fathers, our grandchildren may find themselves living in primitive, pioneer conditions.

The sad fact is that man cannot always hope to solve a problem with an invention.

PERHAPS the greatest technical—and cultural—progress in history has been the medical advance which has lowered the death rate. But since the birth rate has not been lowered at the same time and at the same rate, *death control* has caused a biological revolution which has upset man's relation to his earth.

For the first time in history we could, theoretically, properly feed all of humanity. To do so would require a massive mobilization of technology and presupposes great social changes. The tragic fact is that we are not now doing it. While massive, outright famine has been averted in the face of rapid population growth, two-thirds of the earth's people are to some extent hungry—some of them very hungry.

Even if we were to apply scientific methods to world food production, the growth of population and the increased industrial uses of our resources might mean we could not properly feed all of the *next* generation. For the first time, we are facing the problem posed before the planners of Project Apollo, the "moon-shot." The question: You need more than one person to establish a camp on the moon. It would be fatal to have too many. What is the optimum?

We face this question here on earth: What is the optimum population — the largest population for the greatest good?

Man's reaction to the lowering of the death rate has been to say "marvelous!" He considers this a great good, as he rightly should. But the effects of altering the pattern of dying are many and com-

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plicated. They are not fully understood and even where the experts in genetics and demography believe they know certain answers, the political and social leaders of our day still prefer to ignore the facts.

Consider: Where formerly less than a half of all children grew to maturity, today, in the advanced countries, nine-tenths reach voting age. But the rate of population growth, which in the past only under very exceptional circumstances ever rose to 2 per cent a year (on rare occasions, 3 per cent for short periods)—has now reached the point where these percentages have become the norm for entire continents.

At these rates of increase in such regions as tropical Latin America, i.e., at 3 per cent a year or better, we could create enough human protoplasm to cover the surface of the earth in no more than three centuries.

It may very well be that in terms of the resources available to us — and this in spite of our ability to produce substitutes for many substances already being exhausted — the three billion people who now inhabit the earth are about as many as the planet can really adequately maintain.

A few years ago it was calculated that if the entire U.S. food surplus were distributed fairly to the world's 1.8 billion hungry people, each person would get the equivalent of about two cupfuls of rice every nineteen days. Our own production can help people and nations, but is still only a minute part of the food needed to feed the growing number of people in the world.

Today, with the world population at 3 billion, the annual rate of increase is about 1.7 per cent and the doubling time is just forty years. If the rate continues unchanged, the earth's people will number 6 billion by the year 2,000. In many of the economically underdeveloped lands, the annual rate of natural increase is far higher than 1.7 per cent: 2 per cent in India and China; 3 per cent in tropical Latin America; 3.5 per cent in Taiwan and Singapore; and 4 per cent in Venezuela. A 3 per cent annual increase doubles the population in twenty-three years; 4 per cent, in less than eighteen.

Thus, a generation hence, the number of people in most of the underdeveloped countries that will have to be fed will be nearly doubled. If no progress is made during the crucial years just ahead in improving the per capita welfare in these countries, what prospect is there that it will be possible a generation hence?

Whether we are now close to "our best weight," nobody knows. Perhaps we shall never arrive at precise figures. How can you calculate human values? Yet it is clear that we should not bring more than 100 million children into the world each year if half of them are destined to starve —rapidly or slowly.

WHAT MEANS can be found to provide for the 3 billion inhabitants of the earth today? How can we give our children the basic essentials for a good life? Again, no one now has a scientifically respectable answer.

Tonight two-thirds of the human race will go to bed hungry. We cannot stop the gnawing pain in any half-starved belly by saying that our human technology is theoretically capable of feeding everybody abundantly. The point is that our technology is not doing this.

We must get over our mystical belief that if a thing is technically possible, it is socially possible. Technology is not really magic. There is a price for progress. There are limits to science, there are limits to the earth's resources. There are limits to man's social skills—which we must not accept as final. Yet we must not pretend they do not exist. Detroit gives an eighteen-year-old a 100 mph projectile. Physicists give the new colonels megatons for massacre. Massive technology in a new country has its real dangers—and it has dangers for this country.



Population Bulletin

New World's Population Growth

If the current rate of population increase is maintained, there is virtually no likelihood that "miracles" of technology will assure the people who are hungry today that their children will be less hungry tomorrow. This country may help some countries to be better off five years from now—and far worse off twenty years from now. Let us not dream, nor lie to others or to ourselves, about human survival. Foreign-aid programs are needed, but let us not fool ourselves that they can ever suffice to meet the rising needs of greatly expanded populations.

Problems of survival, and the consumption of irreplaceable resources on a global scale, cannot always be solved by gadgets—nor even by basic new discoveries. We are running out of water, of energy resources, of arable land, and of certain vital minerals. If even a very modest harmony of ecology is in prospect for our children, it is crucial that we recognize our stewardship over the earth. The human race may indeed be the culmination of the evolutionary process; but the nuclear bomb, and these problems of ecology, raise the question of whether we are socially intelligent enough to survive. For survival, social invention must parallel scientific, technical and mechanical invention; and, in this area, we are still chipping flints.

For research in ecology, planning, population control we spend less than a hundredth of what we lay out for our technically exquisite creation of ecologies for one, two, three or twenty astronauts. We spend freely—nay, extravagantly — upon space, upon bombs to kill and upon medical research to defer death. But when it comes to spending to learn how to live, we are misers.

As man approaches the moon, we will find that here on earth the human race will also be rationing its supplies. We have time now to choose whether we will do this by the inhumane methods which have so often prevailed in the past, or whether we shall do it with forethought and wisdom in the interest of the greatest number. The House of Man is a marvelous house. Let us be sure we do not defile it beyond some ecological point of no return.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

Narcotics: The Official View

THE MURDERERS: The Story of the Narcotic Gangs. By Harry J. Anslinger and Will Oursler. Farrar, Straus and Cudahy. 307 pp. $4.95.

Alfred R. Lindesmith

THE HEAD OF the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Mr. Harry J. Anslinger, presents in this book a series of incidents and cases taken from the files of the bureau. They are designed to reveal the inner workings of the higher levels of the illicit drug traffic, and the manner in which the bureau seeks to fight it. Also included are brief accounts from phases of Mr. Anslinger's career before he became head of the bureau in 1930, comments on some of the critics of the bureau's policies and short general discussions of various aspects of the narcotics problem. The book is written in a jazzed-up journalistic style with lurid chapter headings to match the title of the work itself. It ends with a section, "Personal to America," in which Mr. Anslinger appeals to the American public for appreciation and support in the heroic role that he and his agents play in protecting the country from the evil designs of the Mafia, "the syndicate," the Communists, and the dealers in dope. He warns the nation against "schemes that are untried and untested in this country, including plans to set up government clinics or private clinics for dispensing dope," and attributes much of the campaign for such measures to "organized syndicate sources" and "paid publicity men of the underworld."

The portrait that Mr. Anslinger paints of himself is that of a great policeman and a great humanitarian with a profound hatred of criminals and evil and a deep sympathy for addicts. In the preface he modestly says of himself, "As a veteran frontliner in the battle against organized crime, I believe I qualify as an expert." Elsewhere he says, "Even in the midst of running a bureau, I have always tried to protect the rights of the individual. The addict, criminal or victim, is a human being. His rights are as important as my own." That is a remarkable statement for Mr. Anslinger to make, because he, more than any other man, is responsible for the recent legislation in this country which has made the drug addict a virtual outlaw. The severity of the penalties imposed by these laws upon addicts and peddlers alike is well known. While Mr. Anslinger has never advocated a mandatory death penalty for drug users, he evidently believes that the longer they are imprisoned the better, and has cited with approval a proposal which would provide life imprisonment for those who relapsed more than twice. Like drug peddlers, drug users, after a first offense, are denied probation and parole. Nevertheless, Mr. Anslinger brands as a lie the statement made by Stanley Meisler in the February 20, 1960, issue of *The Nation*: "As America's first and only Commissioner of Narcotics, he [Anslinger] has spent much of his lifetime insuring that society stamp its retribution into the soul of the addict."

Says Mr. Anslinger: "The truth also is that in America, and particularly in the Federal Narcotics Bureau, narcotic addiction is regarded and treated as a medical problem." In support of this assertion he cites the work done at Lexington by the Public Health Service, but he knows better than most that the Lexington hospital is primarily a prison and only secondarily a hospital. Public Health officials at that institution have themselves so described it. In any case, medical care for the addict comes only after arrest and incarceration, if indeed, there is any such care at all. Most drug users in the United States receive no medical care, and the primary reason for this is that Mr. Anslinger's bureau and the laws and regulations which it has sponsored prevent it.

THE cops-and-robbers stories which abound in the book are often interesting and sometimes exciting, viewed purely as entertainment. As realistic and accurate representations of the narcotics problem and of law enforcement they leave much to be desired. Obviously they were selected and written up in a manner designed to glorify and glamorize the bureau and its chief. If the racketeers and financiers of the illicit drug traffic were trapped as frequently as suggested in this book, the traffic could hardly have flourished as it has for so many decades. Mr. Anslinger himself told a Congressional subcommittee that most of the persons the bureau sends to prison are addicts and also admits that there are very few addicts in the higher branches of the traffic. Despite the claim that this book tells the story of the Narcotics Bureau "as it should be told," that story is still untold.

Bureau activities which are completely ignored and which could appropriately have been included in a section of the book entitled, "Extra-Curricular," are propaganda activity and the harassment of persons who publicly disagree with the bureau's line. Mr. Anslinger has for many years used bureau personnel, public funds and the government printing presses to spread his views on all aspects of the narcotics problem and to discourage or suppress the expression of dissident opinions. A recent example of this was the investigation of the Indiana University Press in April, 1961, by an Indianapolis narcotics agent acting on orders from Washington. The occasion for this "routine investigation," as Mr. Anslinger called it, was the proposed publication on April 27 of reports by a Joint Committee of the American Bar and the American Medical associations: they dealt with the narcotics problem in a manner not approved by the bureau. Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had already published as a government document a vitriolic and scurrilous attack upon this work.

Some twenty years ago, after I had been visited by a narcotics agent and quizzed concerning my views, I asked Mr. Malachi L. Harney, who was then Mr. Anslinger's assistant, how it happened that a narcotics agent supposed to be pursuing dealers in dope should spend his time checking on the views of university professors. Mr. Harney replied that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had another function besides that of law enforcement, namely, "to disseminate right information and prevent the dissemination of wrong information." This latter function is not discussed in *The Murderers.*

THE MOST remarkable and revealing portion of this book concerns two cases of drug addiction in Washington, D.C., which were dealt with by the Commissioner himself. One of them involved "a beautiful and gracious lady," known personally to Mr. Anslinger, who had become addicted to demerol. Doctors had

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begun to refuse to provide her with the supplies she needed and she was either afraid or unwilling to go to underworld peddlers. She had reached the point of considering suicide as a way out of her dilemma.

When Mr. Anslinger became aware of this woman's situation from her friends, he acted in the role of the great humanitarian. Prosecution, he decided, "would destroy her completely—along with the unblemished reputation of one of the nation's most honored families." Without her knowledge, and with the cooperation of a physician and a pharmaceutical manufacturer, he arranged that the amount of demerol in the sealed bottles delivered to her be progressively cut down and ultimately eliminated entirely, so that she was eventually taking only sugar of milk and no demerol at all. Seeing her off on a liner for Europe, the Commissioner finally told her the whole story and assured her that she was cured, that she had not had a narcotic for a month. The ending was happy —"She broke into tears of joy."

THE other case was that of an addicted legislator, described by Mr. Anslinger as "one of the most influential members of the Congress . . . whose decisions and statements helped to shape and direct the destiny of the United States and the free world." This Congressman refused utterly to do anything about ridding himself of his addiction. Again Mr. Anslinger decided against prosecution. He says:

> It was a delicate moment in world affairs. The situation presented by the morphine-addicted lawmaker presented a precarious problem. There was imminent danger that the facts would become known and there was no doubt that they would be used to the fullest in the propaganda machines of our enemies. Such a scandal could do incalculable harm to the United States and the free world.

Mr. Anslinger saw the Congressman and reports his conversation with him in part as follows:

> "You are in a position because of your power in Congress to hurt America gravely," I said. "If you weren't, I would throw the book at you. But I'm not going to let you hurt this country—no matter what it costs me."
>
> "And just what can you do, Commissioner?"
>
> "I want your pledge not to go to pushers—if I see that you get what you need."
>
> He shrugged. "Why not?" he said. "If you live up to your side, it's a good deal for me."
>
> "I'll see that you get all the drugs you need. I can do this legally because of your age. But you are to get them through one store, and one only. You will go to this druggist whom I will designate for whatever you require."

The deal was made and the described arrangements continued until the Congressman died.

Mr. Anslinger repeatedly expresses the strongest kind of opposition to the legalization of addiction in any manner and to the ambulatory treatment of addicts. For the medical profession he has formulated the following principles:

> Ambulatory treatment of drug addiction should not be tried. Institutional treatment is always required.
>
> An addict should never be given drugs for self-administration (p. 230, Anslinger & Tompkins, *The Traffic in Narcotics*, Funk and Wagnalls, (1953).

Both principles were violated in these two cases. Mr. Anslinger usually describes drug addicts as moral lepers, degenerates and so on, but in the second of these cases he was evidently not disturbed about leaving the destiny of the country in the hands of a dope fiend.

The Commissioner is to be commended for the motives which prompted his action in these two cases, i.e., to protect the reputation of the persons and families involved and to keep the addicts from falling into the hands of underworld peddlers. But what about all the other drug users in the United States who are not so fortunate as to be personal friends of the Commissioner or influential members of Congress? If present narcotic laws are too harsh for Mr. Anslinger's friends or for addicted members of Congress, they are also too harsh for others. What about the thousands of doctors with previously unblemished reputations who have been prosecuted by the bureau? If the Commissioner found legalization of addiction and the ambulatory method of treatment so effective in these cases, why should not a reputable physician be permitted to exercise his discretion to use the same methods?

Mr. Anslinger's description of these two cases alone makes this an important book for all who are interested in the drug problem. In his handling of these two instances of addiction, the head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics has shown a surprising appreciation of European methods of drug control in which essentially the same techniques are used for much the same reasons. The advocates of drug law reform in the United States may now cite these cases as illustrations of a sensible and humane way of dealing with addiction which has actually been successfully tried in this country on a limited scale by none other than the United States Commissioner of Narcotics!

Magnanimous Historian

RECORDS OF THE GRAND HISTORIAN OF CHINA. By Ssu-Ma Ch'ien. Tranlated by Burton Watson. Columbia University Press. 2 Vols. 1106 pp. $20 set.

Kenneth Rexroth

THIS is the last major world classic to be translated into English. Ssu-Ma Ch'ien's history is at least as important as Gibbon's and it has played a far greater role in the formation of the historical consciousness of a far larger number of people. He has often been compared to Herodotus, but I think his meaning for the Chinese is wider than Herodotus' was for the Greeks. The most apt comparison is with not one, but with several historians of Rome. The early parts of his narrative provided the Chinese with a dramatic legend of their beginnings, similar to the heroic tales of Livy. The story of the founding and growth of the Han Empire is a moral history, not unlike that of Tacitus. Finally, the record of his own time, the reign of the Emperor Wu of Han, is, though more implicitly, a philosophic judgment of contemporary forces, again like Tacitus, perhaps even more like Polybius. The many full-dress biographies that take up a great deal of the work are detailed studies of the moral meaning of individuals in the destiny of a people — here the comparison is with Plutarch. In other words, Ssu-Ma Ch'ien was a major historian in a sense it has been given few men to be. His book is one of the foundation stones of the literary culture of a great civilization.

Furthermore, he is a great stylist in the most fundamental sense. It is impos-

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sible for us to catch, behind the simplifying screen of the Chinese written character and the rigorous structure of classical Chinese prose, anything of the original subtleties of tone and flavor. If Ssu-Ma Ch'ien was a stylist of sound and suggestion, like Gibbon, we can never know it. But something else, more important, does come through, even in the English of Burton Watson's translation, or the French of Edouard Chavannes'. This is great style in the organization of ideas and the ordering of their utterance, the muscle tone of a strong and subtle mind.

The human-heartedness and courtesy, the special sense of the fitness of things, all the virtues that are the ideal of the Chinese scholar gentry of the classical period — these are tangible elements of Ssu-Ma Ch'ien's style, in the same way that Gibbon's prose is the major monument of the spirit of the eighteenth century. I have owned the French translation of his *Records* for a good many years and read it several times. I have always come away from it feeling that I had spent those hours in a nobler and more magnanimous relationship than one often encounters amongst either the living or the dead.

TO someone used to the surgical niceties of Tacitus or the rich color of Gibbon, Ssu-Ma Ch'ien seems sparse enough, almost annalistic. Even the most romantic of the great Chinese novels seems to us to gain its effects by an accumulation of bare narrative. The effect of objectivity is stronger still in this classical history — which was almost the beginning of narrative prose in Chinese. Yet the total impact is tremendous. Ssu-Ma Ch'ien invented for the Chinese their special historical conscience. The Western reader slowly finds himself enveloped in an ever-deepening drama whose levels of significance are revealed with the greatest modesty and quiet. This is history as a moral art at its finest.

Burton Watson's English stands up very well against Chavannes' French. It is obvious that he has tampered less, expanded less. Adjectives and other qualifications that give a slightly French tone to Chavannes' style drop out in the English. I suspect that anyone familiar with all three languages would decide that Watson's was a more just, less seductive, translation, although it is patent on comparison that he owes a good deal to Chavannes.

I wish that he, or his publishers, had decided to give us all the work. As it is, the early history of China and some of the odder material in the encyclopedic passages are omitted. I think this reflects a mistaken idea of what we want in history. True, Ssu-Ma Ch'ien is a "source" for the history of the Elder Han Dynasty, and a primary source for the reign of the Emperor Wu. But his retelling of the earlier history of China is a source too — for the evolution of the Chinese mind. We not only want to know what the Chinese did in the years around the Christian era, we want to know what they thought they did and what they thought about it in the millenia that went before and that gradually disappear into pure legend. Which is more important to an understanding of Rome, Livy or Ammianus Marcellinus? The legends of Romulus and Remus or Horatius, or the careful analysis of the neuroses of Claudius or the strategies of Stilicho?

That, really is my only objection to this book. Like Chavannes before him, but in a different way, Watson has not given us a complete Ssu-Ma Ch'ien, although it so happens that the two together do translate most of the work. Perhaps in time Watson will get around to translating the rest. What he has done is certainly excellent.

At the beginning of his *Study of History* Toynbee remarked that it was a scandal that two of the very greatest philosophical historians, Ibn Khaldun and Ssu-Ma Ch'ien, were unavailable in English. Perhaps we have him to thank that this lack is now in a measure corrected. We can't afford to be without any of the "Hundred Best Books," or any of the two hundred, or two thousand, for that matter.

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Russia Without Brimstone

MAY MAN PREVAIL? By Erich Fromm. Doubleday & Co. 252 pp. $4.50. 95c paper.

Theodore Roszak

ERICH FROMM'S "inquiry into the facts and fictions of foreign policy" is primarily an effort to re-draw the portrait of our Russian enemy with some greater truth to life. His picture of the Soviet Union is that of a "conservative totalitarian managerialism," oppressive still, but free under Khrushchev of Stalinist terrorism; a "have" nation growing progressively fonder of the *status quo*, growing progressively wearier of a cold war that drains the resources it needs in order to create a consumers' paradise. Fromm warns us that it is nothing but pseudo-sophisticated ignorance to assimilate the Russia of Khrushchev to the manifestoes of Trotsky and Lenin. The Kremlin may continue to manipulate the ritualistic vocabulary of world revolution in its policy statements, but Stalin's "socialism in one country" meant, in effect, that a culturally reactionary, politically narrow and often isolationist Russian nationalism had come to control the Bolshevik leadership. The USSR had become the Russia of the Czars once more, a conventional nation-state ruthlessly bent on its own economic and military interests.

By now, Russian policies have so far matured along these lines that Khrushchev, at times seeming much more leery of those hungry and unpredictable Chinese than of the stable and satisfied bourgeois West, is maneuvering openly for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world. But meanwhile, back in Washington, the fear of Soviet world conquest has become an article of political orthodoxy. And this exaggerated and largely erroneous assessment of the Soviet menace has warped our relations with the emerging nations, whose justified restiveness we perceive as rampant communism; worst of all, it has burdened us with a morally bankrupt

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policy of deterrence that more and more militarizes our national psychology as well as our economy. Fromm is convinced that deterrence cannot work forever and presents a useful check-list of its deficiencies for those who want to keep their files up to date. He finishes with a series of "suggestions for peace" which include "universal controlled disarmament" and an "American-Russian *modus vivendi* on the basis of the *status quo*."

THERE is, I think, a weakness in Fromm's argument. It is certainly important to realize that Russia is intent, not upon having the world, but simply a sphere of influence; that she is, in other words, behaving like a run-of-the-mill nation-state and not like the vanguard of the proletarian revolution. But Henry Kissinger, among others, has pointed out that national interests are not incompatible with imperial or at least expansionist ambitions. After all, the Romans, without any sort of aggressive ideology, created an empire in the course of searching for a defensible perimeter that would guarantee the security of a city-state. Fromm deals with this point, but not well. "It is clear," he says, "that before [Russia] took the first steps on this road a nuclear war would break out which would be the end of all 'security.'" That sounds like an excellent argument against "universal controlled disarmament."

The fear of purely nationalist expansiveness on the part of the Soviet Union is a very real one; as real as the fundamental instability and tendency toward war of the nation-state system. For that reason, we ought not to be optimistic about how long the peace can be kept on the basis of Summit conferences and gentleman's agreements between the major powers. Khrushchev may not be a Tamerlane; but he needn't be anything worse than a Bismarck (nor need Kennedy or Mao Tse-tung or Adenauer) in order to precipitate war. The real answer to Kissinger's fears does not lie simply in a more sensible interpretation of present Soviet intentions; nor does it lie in deterrence or a limited war capacity. It lies rather in putting the nation-state system out of business as rapidly as possible. And that means striving to make the United Nations work, as if our lives depended on it—because they do. But this is a task which, strangely enough, comes in for very little attention in Fromm's study.

Still, his essay will perhaps help develop a less Satanic conception of the Soviet Union; though for those who have a vested psychological interest in the bogey-man view of the Communists, the truth is bound to mean little. A great many Americans find the whole meaning of their otherwise empty existences in the anti-Communist crusade. The most we can hope is that their neurotic demonism will not be echoed and encouraged in high places.

Summer Night

(After Antonio Machado)

Beautiful
the summer night:
fronting the rectangular
deserted, ample
village square,
tall houses
stand;
their balconies
unshuttered, they command
a prospect of stone benches
of acacia and spindle-trees
that trace
symmetrically black
their shadows
on the white of sand.
Moon
in the zenith,
in the tower
the clock's
illumined sphere.
And I
in this old village
pass alone,
am phantomed by
its sharpness
its solidity.

Charles Tomlinson

ART

Max Kozloff

NOW that the Museum of Modern Art has dusted off Gustave Moreau for our inspection, we can safely return to our lack of admiration for him. Of course, in exhuming this nineteenth-century French fantasist, the Museum has not necessarily thought to rehabilitate him, but simply to answer a number of questions, and to satisfy a curiosity about the relation of the visionary to the abstract which eventually could not be denied. In contrast to the Moreau revival in Paris last June, where 145 works of the master were served up and toasted with almost necrophiliac relish, this show in New York has an entirely different character. A very selective view of Moreau is accompanied here by a liberal dose of Odilon Redon, and an exposure to the latter's little-known mentor, Rodolphe Bresdin. It is a sober effort to put Moreau, the bizarre teacher of Rouault and Matisse, into historical context.

In justifying the exhibition, however, the catalogue foreword states that we are being shown "works that can be considered forerunners of surrealism and that represent a frequently overlooked current of the last century, buried beneath the more powerful trends of realism and impressionism." My complaint is that there is a contradiction between the scholarly interest and the suggestion that we see a proto-surrealism in Redon, Moreau and Bresdin. If they are sufficiently interesting from an aesthetic point of view, they do not need a twentieth-century packaging. Conversely, if their historical position were absolutely assured, so too would be the legitimacy of this show. But neither the one condition nor the other quite holds throughout, a circumstance which makes the whole affair equivocal and rather troubling. With Redon, admittedly, we

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

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are on solid ground. He was an exquisite as well as a significant artist. Moreau, however, was a cryptic, unsatisfying painter, whose reputation in his own time is hard to define, and whose relevance to ours is questionable. And Bresdin, on the face of it, was merely an old-fashioned eccentric.

I AM a little worried, too, about the assumption that the fantasy genre, of which these three men were representatives, was actually "buried beneath the more powerful trends of realism and impressionism." This implies too great a contrast. For not only did these movements themselves encounter enormous initial resistance, but they were by no means homogeneous, since they were composed of, or rather infiltrated by, elements not at all concerned with mere transcription of appearances. As an absolute fidelity to nature became more conceivable, so did it come to seem more unsatisfactory to contemporary critics and painters as an aesthetic solution.

The problem of expression, with all that implies of the inner eye, was sharpened, rather than solved, by the victory over appearances announced by the camera and the Salon. Every serious movement was shaded by this challenge, including Impressionism. Furthermore, the abundance of individuals working in visionary modes outside the academy, or even the *avant-garde* in the second half of the century, makes the present selection more arbitrary than it seems. If we are to have Bresdin, surely the Modern might now give us a look at the extraordinary visions of Victor Hugo; and if Moreau, then why not the diableries of Puvis de Chavannes? In any case, the present show is only a bare preamble to the fierce struggle waged in the creative processes of that time, between the claims of the visible and the invisible.

Yet if we are afforded a skimpy glimpse of a historical battle, it is still a revealing one. Bresdin, to begin with, was the author of hairy little etchings occasionally depicting scenes from the New Testament or medieval Romantic fantasies. They are always entangled in or issuing from an improbable vegetation so dense that the merest glance inspires claustrophobia. Spurner of society, and something of a learned primitive, Bresdin led an underground existence in Bordeaux and Toulouse. In 1872, he spent a year designing a banknote for a competition in the United States (which he insisted on calling the Indies). The episode illustrates the unnatural energy, the impersonality almost, of his mania for minutiae. His mini-etching recalls Breughel, Ensor, Max Ernst, but above all, Gustave Doré. Yet Doré, the effect-conscious sophisticate, never loses control of the whole, however fascinated he is by the parts; Bresdin, the naive, thinks nothing of the whole, and proliferates an imagery whose damp, faintly repellent mossy textures are combined with an automatism that is often practically abstract. As a result, the lichenlike carpets of Bresdin are unheard-of things; Doré's concoctions are very clever stage sets. With Bresdin I am reminded of the definition of a mystic I once heard: one for whom the familiar is astonishing.

Redon, too, seems to have had some of that blindness to his immediate surroundings which is the prerequisite of a visionary. But he was obviously a much more serious observer of nature than his master. That is why I am tempted to think his life studies, a portrait of his wife, certain landscapes, and observations of sea life, the freshest, if not the most affecting, works in his section of the show. At any rate, they bespeak a modesty that runs throughout his art, even in the very large, but especially handsome, decorative panels of 1902. His general iconography escapes any category, being a very private world haunted by plants and insects, and overarched by the image of an enormous, limpid eye. Redon was neither an illustrator nor a naive (his fascination with Symbolist poetry is hardly needed to prove that). Despite the ambiguity of his material, the relation between invention and perception in his work was entirely natural and unforced.

THAT leaves Moreau. This gentleman painter was born in 1826 and hence was sufficiently young to have studied under a Romantic follower of Delacroix and Ingres. While his style was inspired by these two masters, it lacked the passion of the former, and the refinement of the latter. Moreau was to die (he outlived both Seurat and Van Gogh) a relic of the past, having never outgrown the early century baggage of Circes and Jupiters, Hydras and Sphinxes. The wonder of Moreau, perhaps, is not that he mixed the myths of antiquity, the Bible and the East, but that he preserved them so long into the century—until 1898. What had started out as escapist fantasy he petrified long enough for his work to be admired by the Symbolist generation as an aspiration toward faith, and a poetic quivering of the human soul. It is, however, not so relevant that his imagery remained unchanged, as that his form was so rigid and hostile to discovery.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of Moreau's weird sketches or unfinished studies, we might try to learn what his work fairly begs to tell about fantastic art in general. If one asks what is the common factor without which the art of any of these three men could not qualify as fantastic, the answer appears to be in their sense of amalgamation. Whether it be animal with vegetable, solid with gas, Christian symbol with pagan, or even image with background, the force of metamorphosing the one form, object or idea into another comes always with a shock of more or less strangeness. The resulting incongruity may try to evoke terror or wonder at the fabulous, as with Bresdin and Moreau. Only in the work of Redon does it, in addition, more explicitly connote beauty.

But if transformation is the prerequisite of the dream, there always remains the question of how to implement it. How do you give a dream form? In his large pictures, Moreau answers by a studious rendition of natural appearances, such that, in forcing us to accept a multitude of little truths, we might indulge him in the big lie. Moreau was one of the first artists to attempt to photograph a dream. But the tremendous pressure he exerted to convince us, by an alarming pedantry, that each part is "real," capable of being seen, was to be countered by accentuating the unreality of the context. Hence Hercules, an idealized studio model, poses statuesquely among rocks which are intended to be dreamlike but which are only too apparently fake. Whatever there was of originality in his mythological symbolisms, he illustrated, and hence betrayed, with other people's conventions. Because of these contradictions, which prove that Moreau was not interested in the problem of form—or at least formal coherence—he shipwrecked any possibility that his visions would have expressive power.

Yet, while these piecemeal hallucinations lack style, they certainly are modish, in a grisly Victorian way. Metamorphosis may be the first principle of fantasy, but a specific artist's quality of mind is always its crucial ingredient. Moreau's sensibility was feminine, neurasthenic, pettifogging; his delirium fatiguing. Above all, this visionary was materialist enough to shame the lapidary tastes of a J. P. Morgan. Moreau would load his Salomes down with such an accumulation of costume jewelry that Degas was once prompted to say: "Moreau would have us believe the gods

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wore watch chains." The same kind of startlingly bad faith in his vision comes forth in the concealment of certain anatomical parts of his androgynous male heroes. It calls to mind the rumor, shabbier if not more perverse, that the makers of MGM's *King of Kings* fought a great debate over whether or not to shave the armpits of the actor who played Christ.

WHEN we come to Moreau's celebrated "sketches" or water colors, however, we find him, for the first time, an artist with nothing to hide. Their gross, almost illegible, streaks and blotches signify a release from his particular visual constipation. Premonitions of them can already be seen bleeding through the cosmetic flesh of his *Orpheus at the Tomb of Eurydice,* and other unfinished works. Much has been made of their generally abstract qualities, but how they fit into the bulk of Moreau's production has not yet been determined. My own guess is that Moreau was not looking at, but, so to speak, "through" his other paintings when he made them. I think it more congenial to consider them as disaggregations of previous ideas or forms than as preliminary studies—especially since their amorphousness could suggest dozens of possible compositions. In his puzzling sketches, Moreau may thus have been experimenting with strictly chance effects, continuing a long but disconnected tradition of research into the illusory aspects of chaotic forms. But if he flushed a few chimeras from the pictorial bush, he was so cursed by lack of talent that he was able to bag them only infrequently.

In retrospect, it seems possible to put down any untoward claims of modernity for Moreau. The ultimate lesson of the show is still Redon's. The Redon, that is, who was more detached, more completely sensual and—because this meant the obtrusiveness of his lovely pigments or his lithographic blacks—more "abstract" and indeterminate than his colleagues. Moreau, on the contrary, emerges as a pathological artist who had the misfortune to live before there was any acceptable pathological idiom in art. He committed the most pathetic intellectualizing in order to conceal behind his themes an emotional aberration more intense than that experienced by any of his fellow artists. (Not for nothing does one feel that infinitely more passion went into his artistic process than ever got expressed by the finished product.) In the end, the failure of Moreau evokes, at best, a certain morbid chill.

RECORDS: ALBAN BERG

Benjamin Boretz

Lester Trimble has recently become director of the American Music Center. Because of this new responsibility, and because of his wish to devote more time to his own composing, he has resigned as music critic of *The Nation.*

BERG: Lulu Suite; *Three Movements from the* Lyric Suite; Chamber Concerto *(with Israel Baker, violinist; Pearl Kaufman, pianist); Seven Early Songs and Concert Aria:* Der Wein *(with Bethany Beardslee, soprano). Columbia M2S 620.* Three Pieces for Orchestra, *Opus 6. On Columbia MS 6216* Altenberg Songs, *Opus 4 (Bethany Beardslee). On Columbia ML 5428. All with Robert Craft conducting the Columbia Symphony.*

IN *Der Wein,* Alban Berg renders musically the poetic image of drunkenness by imbalance and asymmetry in every detail and dimension. The mask of representation conceals a pathetic artistic confession: *Der Wein,* like almost every work Berg wrote, reveals a fundamental imbalance, a fatal dichotomy between feeling and form.

Dichotomy and paradox followed Berg so closely that he seems to have possessed a personal Trojan horse, a lifelong enemy within. In the Schönberg circle, he was the truly sophisticated intellectual; yet his music appears the least disciplined, the most self-indulgently emotional. Aristocratic and sensitive, he nevertheless wrote two operas, *Wozzeck* and *Lulu,* whose librettos are almost morbidly Expressionistic.

A historical irony is perhaps the most striking. Thirty-five years ago, when Schönberg and Webern were still regarded as hopelessly insane, *Wozzeck* had already secured for Berg a high public place among contemporary composers. But twenty-five years after his death (which had its own ironies), he remains for us an enigmatic figure; having been the first to be celebrated of his generation, he may finally become the last to be understood.

THESE recordings by Robert Craft of a substantial portion of the Berg repertory bear vivid testimony to the split in Berg's creative personality. On the constructive level, he is obviously one of the truly original musical inventors. But his expression is of chaos and hopelessness, the disillusion of the would-be communicant at the altar of Wagnerism and the Romantic delusion of artistic transcendence. All the exquisite dexterity and refinement—Stravinsky calls him "the most gifted constructor in form of the composers of our time"—are thus unnaturally deviated, creating an unresolved tension between style and idea.

Even in the earliest works, the Seven Early Songs, symptoms of disharmony appear. *Sommertage,* confident, tightly made and urgent, is perhaps the finest

BENJAMIN BORETZ is a composer and an associate editor of Perspectives of New Music *(Princeton University Press and the Fromm Music Foundation). He has taught music at Brandeis, Princeton, the University of California and UCLA, and is at present writing a book on twentieth-century American music.*

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of the group. Youthful inconsistency might explain the ominous oversimplicity of the tacked-on, tonal ending. Insecurity, however, is unmistakable at the climax, poised atop the famous chord from Wagner's *Tristan,* and led into by a quotation from Mahler's *Kindertotenlieder.*

Such aberrant incongruities become deeply alarming when they dominate the work of a mature artist. The depth of Berg's *mal de siècle* may be gauged by the increasing prominence he allowed them to assume. In *Der Wein,* he confuses aesthetic expression with actual experience, and steeps the entire context in such obliquities as the contradictory extraction of tonal harmonies from a twelve-tone series.

In the *Lyric Suite,* full of *misterioso* and *appassionata* passages, the meaning is supposed finally to be revealed when in the last movement Berg conjures from his twelve-tone row the entire opening phrase of *Tristan.*

Among these recorded works, the *Chamber Concerto* is probably the most poignant case of self-insufficiency. In constructive beauty, it is not surpassed by any work of our time. Flashes of genius illuminate it throughout: a Mozartian brilliance of rhythmic design, the flickering recurrences of the opening fragments, the strong characterizations of violin, piano and orchestra, and inexhaustible discoveries of new relational possibilities. Only the pathology of *Angst,* of artistic anxiety, can then justify Berg's compulsive reliance on a Faustian bag of mystical-intellectual tricks: numerology (everything is based on the number three in a way that is mathematically ludicrous), musical anagrams on his own name, on Schönberg's and Webern's (supposed to invest the music with personal meaning), and literal quotations from Schönberg's First Chamber Symphony, to seal within the music itself the dedication. Stravinsky might have had this concerto in mind when he described Berg's music as being like "an old woman about whom one says, 'How beautiful she must have been when she was young!' "

BERG'S only really successful works were written before he was thirty: another paradox. The Altenberg songs, Opus 4, are five miniature dramas of genuine intensity. Berg's gestures, despite the scaled-down context, are still operatic in breadth; they tend to tower, like Gulliver, over the Lilliputian walls that contain them. Literal devices of Berg's theatre, the great swelling crescendos, off-stage sounds, word-painting, all appear but are for the most part happily employed. The orchestral sweep that prefaces the cycle is a marvel of sonority and construction. It builds its enormous crescendo from nothingness like a giant kaleidoscopic wheel slowly revolving, its juxtaposed images recurring again and again but never coinciding. Irresistible too is the beautiful humming entrance, wordless, of the voice, and its instrumental recollection, the eternally long-held woodwind humming at the end, against which are heard indistinct subterranean mutterings.

In the Three Pieces for Orchestra Opus 6, Berg seems for once to have found the perfect form for his apocalyptic vision. Here *Angst* is the dramatic protagonist, controlled rather than controlling. As the drama unfolds, one has the awesome sense of witnessing the magnificent final convulsion of an entire musical era. Although in style these pieces might be orchestral interludes from *Wozzeck,* in their purity of musical expression they have a greater strength and density than the opera. All is music, without dilutions of text or theatre. *Marsch,* the last piece, is the real apotheosis of the Bergian crescendo; its sudden ending in quiet is a stroke of consummate mastery. The dramatic tensions are resolved in a silence from which there was for Berg no return.

Nothing in Robert Craft's previous work—his Schönberg and Webern—had prepared me for his depth as a Berg conductor. Except for the *Lyric Suite,* which not even a string quartet has yet been really able to play, and the *Lulu Suite,* whose muddiness may be Berg's fault, the performances are superb. Especially the *Three Pieces,* which are nearly unperformable. Craft not only manages to get all the notes into their proper places, but also balances the great orchestral blocks, controls the tempo with an unerring dramatic sense, and achieves the miracle of a lucent and truly expressive interpretation. The *Chamber Concerto,* too, has never been better recorded; pacing and phrasing are full of virility and life. But neither Israel Baker nor Pearl Kaufman, the piano and violin soloists, has the instrumental or musical virtuosity to master this score.

Bethany Beardslee sings the Altenberg songs, *Der Wein,* and the early songs more perfectly than seems possible—which is what one expects and demands of her. She is a matchless performer, whose beauty of voice and perfect dexterity combine with an absolutely unique devotion to advanced music. To hear her float unerringly from point to point along a vocal line of hair-raising difficulty, serene and secure amid a complicated, dense texture, is reason enough to rush to the nearest record dealer.

You Must Look Twice

Dozens of flies buzz and sit
on the groundhog's corpse.
He lies spread in state
— mounded belly, legs out,
head fallen back, mouth grim —
upon the dark and silken water
that moves solemnly on
between our wooded path
and a green lawn.

It is an October day.
Stiff bullrushes stand
near the far shore.
The river bends in from marshland
and flows slowly from sight
through arches of a concrete bridge.

An October day,
and the dark water
— you must look twice —
is bright with the rolled lawn
and the shimmering black trees
still leaved
that tower from bushes
to the clouds and blue sky
in midstream.

And over the bright trees
on the dark water
flow leaves that dropped from them:
you must look twice
to see those leaves that
an edge curled into the air
take sail and gaily
speed along the slow blue stream.

It is an October day.
A crow cries
and flies to a tall tree.
From the white dock
someone crosses the green lawn
to the white rich house.
The bullrushes stand stiffly
in the thin bent grasses.
And on the wooded path
walking toward the arched
concrete bridge,
a slender woman
a dogged man
and two children:
a boy
who whacks the rocks
with an antlered branch
twice as big as he,
a girl
whose hair
is bright and gentle
as the October light.

Jacob Leed

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Crossword Puzzle No. 945

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Apis-like quality that a mule might have? (14)
9 Feeds kitty with a suggestion of the pre-prandial? (5, 2)
10 Certain stars shot madly from theirs, in Midsummer Night's Dream. (7)
11 Walton is captor of it, perhaps. (8)
12 They get around the morning portions. (6)
14 Not such a soft drink as cider! (7)
15 What one might do on the bottom of a letter passes gradually. (5)
17 The sort of man England expected to be dutiful. (5)
19 Needs an alteration to make groups such as baseball teams. (7)
21 Several such in the legion. (6)
23 The height of musical drama? (Central at one time.) (8)
25 Blue country? (7)
26 Parts of the neck inside at the foot. (7)
27 Proves the basis of logic, as a debater does. (6, 2, 6)

DOWN:

1 One could swear this way the head of 10 is in censure. (9)
2 Numbered among plucky people? (7)
3 The sort of bush article evaporated in farming. (9)
4 Comes close to being a non-amateur in the Indians. (10)
5 The sort of mark some gamblers like to get. (4)
6 Not quite human in the Bible. (5)
7 Relives the lot of the slave. (7)
8 Should she be related to Bebe? (4)
13 Big and soft and possibly on the stage. (5, 5)
15 An instance of flight? (9)
16 Good for him! (9)
18 and 24 Do they give a blow-out and make the aficionados tired? (7, 4)
20 Good bird-dogs? (7)
21 Clothing of some prominence. (4)
22 Is this applied to the horse's tail? No, sir! (5)
24 See 18 down

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 944

ACROSS: 1 Rainbarrel; 6 and 26 Showcase; 10 Hectors; 11 Call off; 14 Sleepers; 15 Omelet; 16 Lictor; 22 Semiscientific; 24 Placebo; 25 Tribune; 27 Composites. DOWN: 1 Rehearsals; 2 Inclose; 3 Broken promises; 4 Rescuer; 5 Escape; 7 Hoot owl; 9 Black Mountains; 13 Stretchers; 17, 8, 18, and 12 Caesar's wife should be above suspicion; 19 Heeltap; 20 Default; 21 Scioto; 23 Epic.

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